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Introduction
The question of whether people in the Nordic countries perceived an increased threat of war during the turbulent period between 1938 and early 1940 has been intensely discussed among Nordic historians during the entire postwar era. According to the conventional Nordic historiography, there were few, if any, in these countries who believed in such an increased war threat. This result has important implications as it, e.g., squares with the fact that the Nordic countries, possibly with exception for Finland, was relatively militarily unprepared when three of them were attacked in late 1939 (Finland) and early 1940 (Denmark and Norway). There are, however, some problems with the way that conventional historiography has described these historical widely held pre-war threat assessments. For example, historians primarily rely on in-depth analyses of recorded sources whereas popularly held threat assessments in the past were hardly written down to allow such a study. Moreover, historians have since long (see, e.g., Carr, 1961 or Marwick, 1970 been aware of the risk that historians are influenced by their own social and political context in such way that it may influence their analysis of historical events, e.g., in the selection and interpretation of issues, angles or even particular sources.
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In the present paper, we present an alternative way to gain insight into the war threat assessments of people in the Nordic countries that can be compared with the ones in the history books. This method is based on estimating sudden changes in yields of government bonds that were traded continuously at the time of the war outbreak and link them to major geopolitical pre-war events. We argue that this will show if and when significant war risk increases occurred as reflected by market prices. The underlying idea is that wars put extraordinary pressures on countries' fiscal balances and may even provoke governments to 1 For example, Lidegaard (2005, p. 152) shows that the Danish government regarded a small and obviously insufficient military defense as a credible signal to Germany of peaceful Danish intentions. Jakobson (1961, pp 139ff) shows how Finland was fully mobilized in October 1939 but then started demobilizing in midNovember, a few weeks before the Soviet attack. On the poorly prepared Norwegian defense, see Skodvin (1991, p. 309) . On the insufficient level of Swedish armament and military preparations before the late spring of 1940, see (Åhslund (1982) and Olsson (1977, p. 12) . 2 Historians are themselves well aware of this problem. For example, Carr (1961) emphasized the interference of historian with the historical writing behind the historical writing has been well understood. There are many examples of the biased historical writing resulting from winners writing the history of wars. Bryld (2003, pp. 14-29) , e.g., argues that the official Danish postwar account of the country's resistance movement during the war is a highly patriotic product in which historians have given in to contemporary pressures for a history of legitimization and national unification.
repudiate their sovereign debt. An increased risk of war will thus translate into an increased sovereign risk or, equivalently, higher yields on traded sovereign debt. 3 Our study specifically analyzes the (possible) occurrence of increased pre-war threat assessments in the Nordic countries before and around the time of the outbreak of World War II. 4 We use newly assembled sovereign yields from the financial markets in Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki and Stockholm quoted in 1938-1940. 5 The empirical method is based on estimating structural breaks in the yield means using the well-known method of Perron (1998, 2003) which select the breaks endogenously, using only the time series properties of the yields and no prior historical information. These breaks reflect the contemporaneously updated sovereign risk assessments of the historical financial market actors. If they coincided with important political or military pre-war events, we argue that the sovereign yield changes were in fact driven by shifts in widely perceived threats of war.
In a second part of our analysis, we compare these new market-based estimates of war threat assessments with the corresponding estimates in the Nordic historiography. This is done by first providing an outline of the "conventional" historical view, drawing on our reading of a large number of writings by well-known and reputed Nordic World War II historians. Of course, this representation is neither perfect nor complete, but we try to minimize the errors by supporting all statements by making explicit references and even citations to the underlying texts. Besides shedding new light on an interesting part of the modern history of the Nordic countries, this comparative analysis also addresses the important question whether conventional historiography is robust to alternative assessments of the same historical phenomena.
The study connects with a growing literature that uses financial market data to analyze the impact of political and institutional change. In the groundbreaking analysis of Willard et al. (1996) , events taking place during the U.S. civil war are analyzed based on their impact on the market for "greenbacks", a special currency issued by the Union. Following their approach, Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze how the events before and during World War II affected domestic and foreign government bond prices at the Zurich stock exchange. They find that these events consistently reflect many of the historically important events, such as the annexation of Austria by the Germans, the outbreak of the war, the Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) find that the war probabilities during the same pre-Iraq war period derived from prices at so-called prediction markets, which are electronic venues trading securities with payoffs contingent on specific political or economic outcomes, were highly consistent with the flow of war-related news and events.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the conventional Nordic historiography has pictured pre-war threat assessments of the general public and some of the methodological problems it is associated with. Section 3 presents the data used and some of the institutional features of the Nordic bond markets around the time of the study. Section 4 discusses the empirical method. In Section 5, the main results of the study are presented and in Section 6 their robustness are analyzed. Section 7 summarizes the evidence and concludes.
Nordic historiography on pre-World War II threats and its problems
When historians characterize past sentiments among the general public, they face some important methodological problems. For example, public opinions are basically never explicit and, hence, documented in written form which makes them almost unobservable to historians in their written source-based analysis. Another, and perhaps more severe, problem is that historians, and in particular war historians, may be influenced by their own postwar political and social context when selecting and interpreting the historical facts at hand. This potential sample selection bias has been noted before by well-known historians (see, e.g., Carr, 1961 or Marwick, 1970 Our focus on Nordic historians is motivated partly because we believe them to be best suited to capture past assessments of the Nordic citizens, but partly also as they correspond the most to the Nordic market actors whose assessments we derive below from bond market prices. Naturally, we do not claim to have a complete coverage of the Nordic historical writing on this topic although we have tried to minimize the problems with interpretation and selection by making explicit references and citations to as many works as possible.
Denmark: Historians agree that the Danes felt quite safe from being involved in any of the war activities taking place on the European continent and that the German invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940, came as a total surprise. However, the Danes were well aware of their geographical proximity to Germany and when they, as the only Scandinavian country, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in mid-1939 this was regarded as "ensuring peace and stability" (Nissen, 1988, p. 353f Gram (1986, p. 15) asserts that it came as a surprise: "With the greater part of Norwegian and Danish political and public concerns focused on the British laying of mines, the German strategic plan for a command of Norway -and the occupation of Denmark it would require -achieved in creating a complete surprise."
case of Norway, Skodvin (1991, pp. 309f ) describes that there were many postwar forces interested in influencing the war history so that "their own people" came out as favorable as possible in the descriptions. 7 It should be noted, however, that behind these nineteen researchers are a scanning of the works of at least twice as many Nordic historians but whose writings say nothing about the public sentiments at this time.
One comprehensive listing of the Nordic World War II literature is Nøkleby (2003 (Zetterberg, 1991, p. 56 ). Yet Jakobson (1961, p. 99) Finland in an awkward position: Everybody could see that it offered Russia its best chance to re-conquer Finland since 1920" (Thulstrup, 1950, p. 8) . Later on, however, also the Finns perceived an increased Soviet threat. Jakobson (1961, p. 139) October but, on the other hand, the government started to send troops home from the front from mid-November onwards. Perhaps this is explained by the evidence found after the war which says that in late November "most diplomatic observers" in Finland and in Moscow thought that "the Soviet Union would not try to enforce its claims on Finland or Romania by force of arms" (Jakobson, 1961, p. 142) .
Norway: Historians agree that of all Northerners the Norwegians felt the most safe from becoming involved in a war on the European continent. The German invasion in April 1940, therefore, is described as a complete surprise. As in the Danish case, very little is said about the public's reaction to the wars on the continent and in Finland. Not even the Altmark incident on February 16, 1940 is described as having affected the Norwegians. During this incident, British troops boarded a German destroyer in Norwegian waters.
This launched a fierce German protests against Norway which resulted in a sharp Norwegian protest against Britain (Skodvin, 1991, pp. 38f) . The German invasion, finally, came as a surprise. Bull (1979, pp. 342f) states that its "surprise tactics was a success" and that many citizens of Oslo, "woken up in the night by the sirens warning for an airborne attack were annoyed since they believed it to be just another practice exercise". Furthermore, Jensen (1965, p. 113) writes: "On the basis of what everyone knew [at the time], the situation was so serious that it now seems unimaginable that we did not react any differently than we did. It only shows how deeply rooted the belief had generally become among the Norwegians, that we could manage to keep out of the conflict. The parliament and government were representatives of a view that was general."
Sweden: As for the Swedish public, most -but not all -historians describe them has having felt quite sure of remaining outside the war. Åberg (1992, p. 522) states that "In the beginning of the war, none of the governments in Sweden, Norway and Denmark seems to have worried about a German attack on Scandinavia". Carlgren (1989, p. 150) asserts that "there is a striking contrast between the confidence shown [after the outbreak of World
War II] and the widespread popular worries that followed the outbreak of World War I".
By contrast, Johansson (1982, p. 138 Finland and the Soviet Union, however, was a severe blow that stunned Sweden." He continues: "There was a general agreement among the overwhelming majority of the population that Sweden must use each day still in peace to arm its military defense. The dominating sentiment was that Sweden enjoyed a respite under the gallows which had to be exploited." (Johansson, 1982, p. 139) . In his important work on the ideological underpinnings of the Swedish newspaper editorialists during 1938-1939, Åmark (1973, pp. 155ff) argues while there were a public awareness of a military threat towards Sweden, it was limited. For example, he states that "there was agreement on that Sweden faced a small risk of war as long as there was no war in the rest of Europe" and, similarly, that "An outbreak of war in Europe was hence a necessary but no sufficient condition for an attack on Sweden" (p. 155). An interesting example of how contemporary ideology could influence written statements is that the editorialists often "deliberately exaggerated the risk of war in order to pursue their own [politico-ideological] agenda in the foreign and defense policy" (p. 160). Perhaps a sign of Sweden nevertheless demobilized its already limited number of military forces on a broad frontier after Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway, which according to Norborg (1981, pp. 249ff ) signifies a firm belief that Sweden would not be drawn into the war activities. 9 On balance, it is fair to say that historians would describe the Swedish threat assessments as practically nonexistent during most of this period, perhaps with exception for the time of the Finnish-Soviet war (November 30, 1939 -March 12, 1940 .
Data and institutional setting
Our main dataset consists of secondary market yields of government bonds of the four Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These yields to maturity were computed from newly assembled daily and weekly bid prices quoted at the bond markets 9 Two much more imminent threats of war to Sweden, according to Norborg (1981, p. 255) and Johansson (2002) , were the "Midsummer Crisis" in June 1941, when the Swedish government considered refusing the Germans to ship troops across Swedish territory, and the "February Crisis" in February 1942 when the Swedes sent large numbers of troops to the Norwegian border in order to meet an expected German invasion based on cracked German secret messages. Government interventions in the bond markets surely took place given that borrowing governments usually are interested in keeping market interest rates, i.e., their cost of capital, as low as possible. Available anecdotal evidence from the Danish and Stockholm markets, however, suggests that these initiatives were both relatively few and had probably a limited long-run effect on market yields. 12 Since our analysis of sovereign yield changes 10 It should be noted that the U.S. weekly yields are weekly averages dated on each Friday whereas the Nordic yields in Stockholm are quoted on the Tuesday of the corresponding week. 11 OTC trading volumes are estimated using securities transaction tax receipts, which by law were to be reported for all transfers regardless of market place. Data only exist for the first half-year 1926 in a survey by the Swedish Banking Inspection reported in a government proposal (Prop. 1927:56 p. 13 ) and for 1948 onwards from the Banking Inspection's recurrent official publication Uppgifter om bankerna samt uppgifter om fondkommissionärerna och fondbörs. 12 Kock (1943) argues that the Swedish Riksbank had almost no effect on market interest rates in [1939] [1940] levels of trading or the price reporting. By consequently using bid and not sell prices we at least diminish the risk of having individual traders influencing prices. More importantly, most gaps appear after the outbreak of wars in the respective Nordic countries and since our focus primarily lies on the behavior of pre-war yields we feel confident that this problem has no significant impact on the basic findings of this study.
Empirical methodology
Our basic methodology is to link major shifts in sovereign yields with simultaneous geopolitical events and thereby get a notion of changes in widely held war threat perceptions as reflected in bond markets. We focus on shifts rather than levels of the yields since there are many influences of a sovereign bond's yield level whereas a large and, in particular, sudden shift does more likely reflect a shock to the continuously update sovereign riskassessments made by market actors. sen, 1968, p. 16) . Furthermore, the monetary policy issues addressed by Nationalbanken itself in the early war years rather concerned how to prevent interest rates from falling too much in the light of the abundant liquidity levels in the Danish economy. In other words, the Danish central bank worked to raise, not reduce, market interest rates during the war period. We employ a standard econometric methodology for testing for and estimating unknown multiple structural breaks in univariate time series, developed by Perron (1998, 2003) . 14 Among the many advantages of using this methodology is that it does not require any prior information about the existence or timing of breaks. Instead it estimates them endogenously, using only the information contained in the time series, i.e., letting the data speak. While this technique has been shown to be important to ensure consistency of the estimated breaks (Perron, 2006) , it also removes any possibility of a researcher influence in picking the significant shifts that are to be evaluated against the contemporaneous political development.
We estimate the breaks by fitting the following system of linear regressions:
where subscript j (j = 1,…, m + 1) denotes segments separated by m structural breaks, y t is a country's nominal sovereign yield at time t expressed in basis points, c j is an estimated intercept (the average yield in each segment) and ε t is a white noise error term. 15 The procedure of the method is, in brief, to begin by testing for existence of breaks using two types of Wald tests. If these indicate that breaks exist, the method continues by estimating their exact number and then their size. One important parameter to decide before the estimations is how long the shortest allowed segment length can be in order for breaks to be called "structural". We follow the conventions and require breaks to be at least ten percent of the total sequence length (denoted as "T" in Table 1 ). Specifically, our segments are about 20 days in the daily series and 16 weeks in our weekly series.
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Our motivation for using a relatively simplistic model as in equation (1) is that this mean model produces intuitive and easily interpreted estimates of the structural breaks; the break size, ĉ j -ĉ j-1 , is the number of basis points with which the yields increase or decrease.
Two potentially problematic modeling issues arise. First, most high-frequency financial variables exhibit some degree of persistency which are not fully accounted for in (1). The Bai and Perron methodology has an apparatus for dealing with a wide range of error distributions, however, and it alleviates most such modeling concerns. Moreover, simulations by Paye and Timmerman (2006) suggest that persistency has limited effect on the ability of Bai and Perron's method to consistently pick the correct break points, especially when break magnitudes are large (which they are indeed in our analysis)
A second modeling issue of importance is that nominal sovereign yields also pick up influences from factors other than the default risk, predominantly various macroeconomic fluctuations such as inflation or market interest rates and expectations about them. We address this influence in a number of robustness tests reported in Section 6. Specifically, we replaced the yields in equation (1) with their benefits (retained cash that is not paid out to lenders). Wars may alter both costs and benefits in different directions due to many factors, e.g., the fiscal status and credit histories of countries, the extent and length of the war and the setup of existing debt contracts (e.g., presence of gold clauses). Looking at history, Suter (1992, pp. 61-83) provides several examples of belligerent countries that were either defaulters or that kept on servicing their debt. In an attempt to determine the effect on sovereign yields by the arrival of news of wars, Mauro et al. (2006, ch. 5) show that emerging market yields quoted in London in 1870-1914 increased by on average 300 basis points (which is almost a doubling of yields) as a result of war news. Additional evidence on the robustness of interwar bond investors is the remarkable cases of government bonds issued by countries that formally had ceased to exist, e.g., Tsarist Russia after 1917 or Austria after 1938, that kept on being traded and quoted at almost normal yield levels for years. 17 Hence, historical evidence suggests that while wars did not automatically imply that belligerent countries defaulted on their debt there seem to have been fears of this eventuality as shown by significantly increased market yields. 17 Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006) show that Tsarist Russian bonds kept being traded in Paris in 1918-1919 on yields averaging at no more than 8 percent! Similarly, Austrian bonds traded in Zurich throughout World War II at about a 15 percent yield (Frey and Kucher, 2000) . 18 There are additional results from the estimations that do not appear in the table, including the SupF T (ℓ|0)-and max 1≥ℓ≥L SupF T (ℓ|0)-tests for existence as well as the sequential SupF T (ℓ+1|ℓ)-test for the number of breaks. These are available upon request. 19 An "assessed war probability", calculated as the Stockholm yields right before the war divided by the tip of the yield spike right after the war outbreak, for Denmark is 40% (750 bp / 1,150 bp = 0.395). 
Results and comparative analysis

Structural breaks in Nordic sovereign yields
Comparing the views of historians and markets
We now go on to compare the estimates of pre-war threat assessments made by historians (discussed in Section 2) and bond markets (discussed in Section 5.1). Neither approach is free from methodological and data-related problems and this exercise is hence not about any version being "right" or "wrong" or "better" or "worse". Rather, we wish to shed light on whether they differ at all and, if so, why and in what way. In Table 3 , we summarize the findings from previous sections by periodically classifying the assessed threat levels by country and methodological approach. A first result is that there is agreement on that 
Robustness analysis
As we highlighted in Section 4 when discussing the estimation of structural breaks in sovereign yields, there is a risk that the sudden mean-shifts may be partly, or wholly, driven by an unobserved simultaneous shock to some nominal macroeconomic variable (e.g., inflation or market interest rates) which, in turn, would have a first-order impact on the nominal bond yield. In order to control for such exogenous effects, we rerun the structural breaks analysis but now use sovereign yield spreads on the left hand side. Yield spreads should, at least in principle, cancel out all common macroeconomic influences and leave the spread being solely determined by the sovereign risk. Unfortunately, any common elements of sovereign risk across certain types of countries, which we also would like to capture in our breaks, would also be eliminated when using spreads. For example, if there would be an increased risk of attack directed specifically to all neutral countries, Nordic spreads over, say, Swiss sovereign yields would not be able to contain this risk component.
If we find that the breaks estimated when using spreads are different from those using yields in terms of a) the occurrence and timing of break dates and b) the magnitudes of the estimated breaks, we would be inclined to seriously doubt the robustness of our previous findings. In particular, if the spreads do not contain any statistically significant positive pre-war breaks around the time of the major geopolitical shocks, our prime identifier of increased war threat assessments of the general public, our core results would be more or less rejected. We compute spreads by subtracting from each Nordic yield an equivalent government yield of different reference countries as follows:
The two subsequent sections present robustness analyses of two variants of spreads.
Nordic spreads in the Stockholm market
First we estimate structural breaks in weekly yield spreads using Nordic yields in Stockholm and one of three reference yields: U.S. long-term (12 years) government bonds, U.S.
short-term (3-5 year) Treasury notes, and the Swedish government yields. Obviously, the latter only allows robustness tests of the breaks in Danish, Finnish and Norwegian yields.
The spreads over the Swedish yields are conceptually the best since they are denominated in the same currency and thereby best able to separate out macroeconomic shocks to nominal returns. While the U.S. yields only do this for globally common trends or shocks, they are still relatively suitable as the U.S. and the Nordic countries were similar in other respects: they were both outside the war at this period and yet their national economies (and hence the forces driving nominal fluctuations) were highly affected by the wartime turbulence. Table 4 presents the findings of the robustness break analysis. Overall, the pre-war breaks in the basic yield analysis appear also in the spread analysis. In fact, there are even some earlier minor sovereign risk increases picked up in the spread breaks. The differences in timing ("Datediff.") of the estimated breaks are mostly small (0 or 1 weeks), except in the Swedish case where the timing is more affected but still in the pre-war period. The size difference of the breaks ("Sizediff.") is somewhat larger, with spreads mostly generating smaller breaks. In no instance, however, do the size switch sign which further reassures us regarding the robustness of the baseline findings of our yield analysis.
Danish and Norwegian spreads in the Copenhagen and Oslo markets
In a second set of robustness tests, we analyze Danish and Norwegian spreads in their home markets, subtracting one of the following reference yields: British 2.5% consol yields, Swiss confederate state and railway bonds, the U.S. long-term government yield, and the Swedish yield. Due to data availability we only have monthly series, and therefore we focus on spread changes over some specific pre-war time periods. Finland is left out because of its lack of domestic yields after early October 1939.
In Figures 9 and 10 , the different Danish and Norwegian spreads are displayed over the years [1938] [1939] [1940] . Looking at spread changes between the early pre-war period (1938-early 1939) and the late pre-war period (1939/early 1940) , that Danish spreads over U.S.
and British yields increased markedly whereas they increased only moderately, and even decreased, over Swiss and Swedish yields, respectively. Over the same period, all Norwegian yield spreads increased, three of them substantially and one of them (the Swedish) moderately. These results indicate that the significant pre-war threats observed in our basic break analysis remain in most yield spread definitions. Interestingly, the spreads over U.S.
and British yields consequently increased more during 1939 than the Swiss, and especially the Swedish spreads did. The reasons for this heterogeneity are not obvious. While both Sweden and Switzerland were the only neutral countries, Britain was the only one to enter the war in 1939, Sweden was much more integrated economically than any of the other three and the U.S. is the only non-European country. Regardless of what, however, the main message is that the spreads contain much of the pre-war threats previously found.
Concluding remarks
Did the people in the Nordic countries expect that their own countries would be drawn into war activities during the turbulent years 1938-1940? We have in this paper examined two different empirical methodologies and their answers to this question. In the first one, "conventional" Nordic World War II historical writing has argued that there were few, if any, in these countries who strongly believed in an attack on their countries. The second approach, by contrast, focuses on large shifts in Nordic government bond yields during 1938-1940 and the fact that changes in these yields that coincide with important war events reflect changes in war risks that were assessed in real time by the contemporaries.
Our main finding is that there are several instances of disagreement between the two interpretations of history. While historians claim that the Nordic peoples felt safe until the autumn of 1939 (in the case of Finland), the winter of 1939 (Sweden) and early April, 1940 (Denmark and Norway), the prices of these countries' sovereign debt fell considerably several months before these conjectured dates. In most cases, the yield shifts were direct responses to major war-related events such as the announcement of the MolotovRibbentrop in late August 1939 or the Soviet attack on Finland in late November that year.
We also find, however, points of agreement between historians and markets. This clearly indicates that market traders had not fully anticipated the wars but only regarded them as likely to some degree (we propose assessed war probabilities in the range of 35%-54%).
Although there are notable discrepancies between the two versions of history, our comparative analysis says little about any of them being either "right" or "wrong". Both approaches suffer from methodological and data-related problems. For example, historians predominantly use text-based sources while past public opinions may hardly be evident in such data material. Historians' selection and interpretation of the historical facts may also reflect views of their own political and social context, which might bias their conjectured war historiographies. On the other hand, the financial market-based analysis relies on the quality of the historical statistical data, which can often be questionable. Furthermore, the econometric method used relies on modeling choices and various assumptions that could be discussed. In other words, there are pros and cons with both approaches and we would therefore recommend a broad methodological approach when analyzing subtle issues concerning the mind sets of large populations from in the past. Note: "Bond yield" reproduces parts of the results in Table 2 . "Date" denotes break date and "Size" break size (as in Table 3 ). "Datediff." denotes the number of weeks that differ between the structural breaks estimated for bond yields (eq. (1)) and bond spreads (eq. (2)). "Sizediff." is the corresponding difference in estimated break sizes. 
